RESEARCH INTERESTS
- American Politics
- Presidency
- Congress
- American Political Development
- American Political Thought
- Public Policy
PUBLICATIONS
Articles
John A. Dearborn, “The Foundations of the Modern Presidency: Presidential Representation, the Unitary Executive Theory, and the Reorganization Act of 1939,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (March 2019): 185-203.
John A. Dearborn, “The ‘Proper Organs’ for Presidential Representation: A Fresh Look at the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,” Journal of Policy History 31, no. 1 (January 2019): 1-41.
- Received Founders Award for Best Graduate Student Paper, Presidents and Executive Politics Section, American Political Science Association, 2018
Book Reviews
John A. Dearborn, “American Imperial Development,” Journal of Politics 81, no. 2 (April 2019) – review essay. Forthcoming. (invited contribution)
DISSERTATION
Title: “The Representative Presidency: The Ideational Foundations of Institutional Development and Durability”
Archival research for this project is being funded by a 2017 Dirksen Congressional Center Research Grant, 2017 Yale Center for the Study of American Politics Grant, 2018 Carl Albert Center Visiting Scholar Research Grant, 2018 Dole Institute of Politics Travel Grant, and 2018 UCLA Thayer Short-Term Research Fellowship.
A central puzzle in American political development is why Congress created the institutional presidency, a set of arrangements that passed to another branch authority that seemed securely vested by the Constitution in the legislature. In answering this question, I set forth specific criteria that can establish the relationship between ideas and political change over time. I show that acceptance of the idea of presidential representation – an assumption that presidents possess and act based on a unique perspective due to their national constituency – was an essential precondition for many of the laws that together constitute the institutional arrangements of the modern presidency. The idea was prominently contested in hearings and debates in Congress. However, innovations based upon this claim pushed against the written constitutional frame.
This project examines and compares the development and durability of laws passed by Congress creating the institutional presidency in five policy areas (budgeting, trade, reorganization, employment, and national security) over two periods of time (1921-1947 and 1973-1983). The first period demonstrates the political efficacy of the idea of presidential representation in supporting institutional reform. The second period shows what happens to reformed institutions when the idea behind them falls out of favor. Laws addressing presidential authority budgeting, trade, reorganization, and employment were specifically influenced by the idea of presidential representation, while national security reform did not rely on this idea. By examining the changing influence of the idea of presidential representation, I provide a fresh understanding of critical episodes in the development of relations between the presidency and Congress.
WORKING PAPERS
OTHER WRITINGS
“Presidential Representation and Donald Trump’s Reaction to the California Wildfires,” A House Divided, November 12, 2018.
“The Unitary Executive Theory versus the ‘Steady State’ in the Trump Era,” A House Divided, September 27, 2018.
ONGOING RESEARCH
“Interpreting the President’s Message: The Changing Meanings of ‘Equality of Opportunity.'”
“Federalism and the University: The Morrill Act of 1890 and the Yale-Storrs Controversy.”